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ENGAGING DISENGAGEMENT:  THE POLITICAL REINTEGRATION OF SIERRA LEONE'S
REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT
Kieran Mitton
Introduction
The conflict between the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Sierra Leonean government
represents  a  highly  instructive  study  for  reintegration  projects,  primarily  due  to  the motives
underpinning violence and the identity of the main protagonists. Far from being a conventional
political insurgency readily lending itself to peaceful political transformation, the RUF possessed
within the ranks of its young and brutalised recruits a fundamental rejection of Sierra Leone's
political structures. As such, Sierra Leone presented a unique challenge for reintegration efforts,
requiring not only the immediate reconciliation of ex-combatants with victims and civil society,
but  also  the  long-term  political  incorporation  of  a  group  of  youths  defined  by  their  very
disengagement from and distrust of the political system. 
The conflict began in early 1991 when a small group of combatants crossed the Liberian border
into eastern Sierra Leone, seeking to topple the one-party regime of Joseph Momoh.1 Met by a
weak and ineffective counterinsurgency, a decade of brutal conflict ensued in which two thirds of
Sierra Leone’s population were displaced and up to 50,000 were killed. It was not until 2002,
following a series of failed negotiated settlements, that peace was officially declared by a new
civilian government. The cessation of hostilities owed much to the intervention of British and
Guinean troops in 2000,  which precipitated the deployment  of  17,500 UN peacekeepers,  the
largest  such  force  of  the  time.  These  developments  enabled  the  full  operation  of  a  DDR
programme, which had suffered repeated interruption since its  initial  introduction in 1998. A
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and Special Court were also established, and in
December  2005,  the  United  Nations  Mission  in  Sierra  Leone  (UNAMSIL)  withdrew  its
peacekeepers.  In  2007,  Sierra  Leone  conducted  national  elections,  returning  the  All  Party
Congress (APC) to power.
The DDR process, which ran in three distinct phases between September 1998 and January 2002,
disarmed a total of 72,490 combatants (including 24,352 from the RUF) of which 71,043 were
demobilised and  55,000 received reintegration assistance.2 Despite the relative effectiveness of
the  demobilisation  and  disarmament  programmes,  Sierra  Leone  remains  in  a  state  of  abject
poverty, with high levels of youth unemployment and limited opportunities serving to undermine
the reintegration of ex-combatants. Former RUF fighters make up a significant portion of those
struggling to find work,  with many expressing dissatisfaction with the lack of  prospects  and
cynicism with regard to the ruling authorities in Freetown – factors which proved instrumental to
the  original  onset  of  conflict.  Success  in  politically  reintegrating  ex-combatants  should  not,
therefore, be judged solely by the absence of renewed violence or the conduct of free and fair
elections. Rather,  it  must  also appreciate the extent  to which ex-combatants hold faith in the
political system, and peace generally, to deliver solutions to problems of social and economic
disparity or decline, and the extent to which ex-combatants themselves are shaping this process.
In this light, this article argues that despite progress in many key areas, former fighters of the
RUF have yet to be fully politically reintegrated. The Sierra Leone experience demonstrates that
successful political integration does not simply amount to political participation per se, but rather
requires specific forms of political participation which reinforce the primacy of peaceful political
interaction over and above other means for affecting change.
The RUF: 'not so much a movement as an environment'3
To assess the political reintegration of the RUF, it is first necessary to understand that the rebel
group was not by nature overtly 'political'  in the conventional  sense. The RUF differed from
many non-state armed groups in that it lacked widespread popular support or a coherent overall
political and military strategy.4 Rather than appeal to the civilian population for logistical support
or to establish a political constituency, the RUF’s relation to the people was characterised by
brutal atrocities which often rendered it deeply unpopular, both domestically and internationally.5
With much of its rank-and-file membership comprised of child soldiers, many of whom had been
forcibly recruited, the RUF represented a largely illiterate, politically and socially dislocated body
of brutalised youths, who despite possessing a myriad of legitimate grievances, were ill-equipped
to  return  (or  be  introduced)  to  civil  society  and  channel  these  grievances  through  peaceful
political discourse.
The initial invasion of Sierra Leone, launched across the border from Liberia in March 1991 with
Charles Taylor's sponsorship, involved little more than 300 combatants, many of whom had
limited connection with Sierra Leone.6 Whilst the border populations in the south and southeast
may at first have been sympathetic to the fighters’ grievances against the APC regime, any
support was quickly squandered through the RUF’s looting and atrocities. As the conflict
developed, former Sierra Leone Army (SLA) corporal and RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, continued
to claim an ideological basis for the insurgency, framing the rebellion as an attempt to deliver
Sierra Leone from decades of mismanagement by a corrupt and self-serving elite.7 Nevertheless,
this rhetoric was consistently undermined by RUF abuses against the civilian populace, often
conducted for economic profit. Despite such abuses, the insurgency was able to grow by
incorporating a large body of economically and socially marginalised youth, many of whom
already existed on the fringes of Sierra Leonean society prior to conflict, eking out a living in
diamond mining and illicit trade. For those resentful of a government operating by an inequitable
system of patrimony, the rebellion offered an opportunity both to defy political authority and to
gain access to resources from which they had previously been excluded.8 The RUF sustained
itself logistically through the systematic extraction and trade of such resources, particularly
alluvial diamonds, which it exchanged for weapons and ammunition. To a considerable degree
therefore, the political economy of war ensured that conflict became, for many, an end in itself.9 
The motivation of combatants also related to physical security and social empowerment – the
capacity to exact revenge on those deemed responsible for peacetime inequalities and the status
and camaraderie shared among fellow fighters.10  In this sense, the RUF was far less a political
movement  with  a  definite  goal  as  it  was  an  environment  facilitating  modes  of  behaviour
perceived as beneficial by combatants. Even so, many rebel fighters enjoined conflict not through
some cost-benefit analysis but through direct abduction into RUF ranks. For many such fighters,
the effects of brutalisation rather than the lure of loot defined their relationship to violence, yet as
such,  their  motives  were far  removed from an overarching political  ideology.  This is  not  to
suggest  that  combatants  were  without  genuine  political  grievance  or  conviction.  Indeed,  the
disillusionment with ruling elites was itself a factor in determining the RUF’s apolitical nature: it
did not represent a political alternative but an alternative to politics altogether.  Violence was
often manifested as a war against authority and as a total rejection of traditional hierarchies, with
many combatants expressing a desire to punish Sierra Leonean society or to bring it to ruin. RUF
activity  displayed a clear  determination to  postpone political  resolution and,  accordingly,  the
language of democratic elections and peace prompted spates of violence clearly intended to deter
potential voters and punish those pushing for political reconciliation. 
The implications for political integration
The nature of the RUF has rendered its political reintegration far more complex than that of an
armed group defined by a  readily identifiable  political  agenda. In  seeking through conflict  a
resolution to problems of economic and social disparity, and in finding in violence a means by
which to achieve empowerment or a degree of basic welfare security,  many RUF combatants
were  far  less  concerned  with  political  concessions  or  governmental  reform.  Rather  than
formalising the RUF’s political legitimacy, political reintegration would involve building a trust
among combatants in political interaction over and above violence as a means to secure their
basic  welfare  needs  and  address  problems  of  corruption  and  economic  underdevelopment.
However,  for  those  who  had  more  to  lose  in  peace  than  in  conflict,  political  incorporation
represented at best a useful façade for the continuation of abuses, and at worst a direct threat to
their  status  and position. Included in this group were the commanders and leaders for whom
conflict had secured wealth from looting, diamond mining, illicit trade and the availability of
cheap  labour  in  the  form  of  loyal  fighters.  Through  their  involvement  in  atrocities,  many
commanders  also  feared  prosecution  and  peacetime  reprisals,  reinforcing  their  reluctance  to
renounce  violence  for  reconciliatory  discourse.  As  such,  the  RUF  leadership  was  in  many
respects an obstructionist presence at peace negotiations, with commanders across the movement
actively deterring rank-and-file combatants from entering DDR programmes, taking on the role
of the proverbial ‘spoiler’. 
If the RUF leadership was uncommitted to political reintegration, the group’s rank-and-file were
ill-equipped for political reintegration. For those who spent many years in the RUF, particularly
those abducted at  a young age or recruited at the inception of the  conflict,  the divorce from
society was  so complete  as  to  require  political  induction rather  than  reintegration.  For  such
fighters, the norms and codes of civil society, the historical context of the conflict and the very
notion  of  political  interaction  simply  lay  beyond  their  sphere  of  experience.  Combatants
commonly shared an entrenched fear and hostility towards civilian society, which in combination
with a lack of basic education and high levels of illiteracy, served to obstruct their engagement in
public debate and formal political participation.
Ending the Conflict: 'Spoilers' and the Spoils of Peace 
The above complexities are highlighted by the successive attempts to find a peaceful resolution to
the  Sierra  Leone  conflict.  These  attempts  also  illustrate  the  general  principle  that  political
reintegration efforts are often ineffective if  they are not grounded in an understanding of the
unique context and nature of the non-state armed group at hand. Initial peace agreements failed to
understand the nature of the rebel movement, the motivations of its leadership and the concerns
of combatants – they treated the RUF as a conventional political insurgent group and sought to
establish  political  reconciliation  with  the  higher  echelons  of  its  leadership.  These  peace
agreements were derailed by a lack of real commitment by RUF leaders, who continued to seek
the perpetuation of conflict, preferring the spoils of war to those of peace. 
The Abidjan Accord
The Abidjan Accord of November 1996 represented the first major breakthrough in bringing the
RUF to the negotiating table and establishing an agreed platform for peace. Following elections –
a product of internal pressure from civil society groups, who had the support of the international
community  -  the  military  regime  of  the  National  Provisional  Ruling  Council  (NPRC)  was
replaced by the civilian government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People's Party
(SLPP).  Kabbah  promised  amnesty  to  the  RUF on  condition  that  it  sought  terms  of  peace,
threatening military action should the rebels fail to comply. Revealingly, it was the latter factor
which proved most significant in bringing the RUF to the negotiating table, following as it did a
series of military setbacks at the hands of the increasingly effective Civil Defence Forces (CDF),
acting in conjunction with private security firm Executive Outcomes. Having failed to prevent
elections through the violent intimidation of the electorate and last-minute negotiations with the
NPRC, the RUF now saw peace talks as a means to halt the progress of the CDF and to expel
Executive Outcomes from the military equation.11 
The Abidjan Accord provided clear incentives and provisions for the political reintegration of the
RUF into the democratic process, including the establishment of an international trust fund to
finance the RUF's transformation into a political party. However, reflecting perhaps the RUF’s
weakened military position, Kabbah’s government did not offer the RUF any leadership posts,
either  in  central  or  local  government.  Rather  than politically  incorporating the RUF into the
existing regime where it  could share power, the government sought to incorporate it  into the
democratic system where it would have to contend for power. Such democratic competition did
not favour the RUF, which lacked broad political support as well as allies on the international
scene. The Accord therefore failed on two key fronts. First, it offered the RUF leadership no real
incentives for peace. While the invitation to form a political party held little appeal for those
motivated less by political ideology as by the pursuit of status and economic wealth, the RUF’s
lack of support made the prospect of a democratic contest all the more unattractive. Furthermore,
despite  assurances  of  amnesties,  RUF  commanders  remained  convinced  that  some  form  of
retaliation would occur once they take their place among a hostile civilian population. 
Second, the accord failed to appreciate the relationship between the RUF leadership, who on the
most  part  profited  from conflict,  and  its  rank-and-file  members,  who  gained  less  economic
advantage and were generally more willing to seek peace should it provide welfare and security.12
The provision to  establish a  RUF party mistakenly treated the rebel  leadership as  politically
representative of combatants, risking a consolidation rather than a weakening of their hold over
fighters. In this context, the arrest of RUF leader Foday Sankoh in Nigeria in March 1997 did
appear  to  offer  a  real  window of  opportunity  to  prise  young  rebels  away  from their  jungle
enclaves; reports at the time confirmed that many combatants felt confusion and ambiguity over
their  leadership  and  were  demoralised  by  diminishing  supplies  and  increasing  desertion.
Nevertheless,  simply  decapitating  the  organisation  proved  insufficient,  as  other  senior  RUF
leaders, also with a vested interest in conflict, were quick to fill the vacuum created by Sankoh’s
arrest.  Under Sam Brockerie,  who emerged to replace Sanko as RUF leader,  illicit trade and
diamond-mining  operations  actually  increased.13 Furthermore,  commanders  across  the  RUF
actively misled combatants as to the precise details of the Abidjan agreement: rank-and-file RUF
were not informed of the crucial offer of immunity from prosecution nor of the benefits promised
by the DDR programme.14 Rather, commanders played on the common belief that the government
sought to prosecute RUF combatants for their war-crimes. This misperception was reinforced by
the  failure  of  Kabbah's  government  to  reign  in  the  CDF,  leading  to  violent  clashes  that
undermined the trust and security required for DDR and signalled the collapse of the accord. 
The Lomé P  eace Agreement  
The  lack  of  real  commitment  to  the  Abidjan  Accord  was  made  clear  in  May  1997  when
disaffected elements of the SLA, calling themselves the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
(AFRC),  seized power  from the civilian government  and immediately invited the RUF, their
supposed military opponents,  to  join them in government.15 While the AFRC/RUF junta was
eventually  dislodged  from  Freetown,  its  devastating  return  to  the  capital  in  January  1999
convinced many international  parties  that  Kabbah's government  should seek a speedy power-
sharing  deal  with  the  RUF.  Accordingly,  in  July  1999  and  under  significant  international
pressure, the Lomé peace agreement was signed. The settlement provided for the RUF's direct
incorporation  into  government;  it  offered  the  leadership  immunity  from  prosecution  and
appointed the newly freed Foday Sankoh as Vice-President and as head of the Commission for
Strategic Mineral Resources, National Reconstruction and Development.16 
While  Lomé offered  economic  and  political  benefits,  such  as  official  control  over  lucrative
resources in Kono along with a degree of legitimacy, commanders continued to pursue personal
gain  through  continued  conflict  and  at  the  very  least,  in  forestalling  disarmament  and
demobilisation. Aware that the RUF would not fare well in national elections, Sankoh sought to
maintain his political status as leader of the rebel force. He therefore viewed DDR as a direct
threat to his position and bargaining power, a logic shared by commanders across the RUF who
had also profited from the looting and illicit  trade conducted by their  combatants.  The RUF
cadres themselves widely supported a move toward DDR, reflecting a growing war-weariness
and general disillusionment with rebel life.17 However, the DDR programme lacked provisions to
counteract  the  obstructionism  of  RUF  leaders.  Commanders  again  restricted  combatants’
knowledge of  the  agreement’s  provisions  and,  in  some instances,  forcibly re-mobilised those
attending demobilisation camps.18 
Full implementation of the Lomé settlement only occurred once the prospect of a RUF defeat was
raised, again reflecting a military rather than political logic at the heart of the group's leadership.
Following the abduction of UK soldiers in August 2000 by a faction of the AFRC, known as the
West Side Boys, British troops struck a decisive blow against the group, effectively destroying
it.19 The involvement of the UK signalled to many RUF fighters that the conflict could not be
won, or perhaps more accurately, that it could not be maintained, and this proved an important
factor in their decision to enter the subsequent DDR programme.20 Of even greater significance in
this  regard  was  the  role  of  Guinea,  which  responded to  RUF incursions  with  a  devastating
counter-offensive.21 These developments led to the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement being signed in
November 2000, and to the deployment of a 17,500-strong UN force to Sierra Leone in 2001.
With most RUF leaders arrested or routed by the Guinean counter-offensive, their hold over rank-
and-file  combatants had largely been broken.  In  the presence of  a bolstered UN force,  RUF
combatants  demobilised in large numbers.22 In  contrast  to  the  Lomé negotiations, the RUF’s
military situation meant that it was in no position to insist on the disarmament of the SLA as a
precondition for its own demobilisation, nor could it demand the expulsion of  foreign troops
operating outside of the UN mandate. Instead the RUF recommitted to the Lomé agreement in
full,  enabling  President  Kabbah  to  declare  the  war  officially  over  in  2002.  That  same  year
elections  were  held,  with  the  RUF,  as  a  newly  transformed  political  body,  fielding  its  own
candidates.  
The difficulties encountered in reaching peace in Sierra Leone demonstrated three requirements
for political reintegration relevant to this context.  First,  any lasting settlement would have to
involve more than the satisfaction of a particular grievance against the state. Offering the RUF an
opportunity to compete for the vote of an electorate against which it had committed a decade of
atrocities was also insufficient  for winning its  commitment  to the peace process.  Instead, the
incentives that truly held value for combatants were the promise of security (or conversely the
threat of physical defeat), the offer of amnesty, the provision of employment and basic social and
economic welfare – ends previously achieved through violence.23 Second, the political integration
of  the  RUF  also  required  the  dismantling  of  the  rebel  leadership,  whereby  rank-and-file
combatants  could  be  prised  apart  from  the  negative  influence  of  RUF  commanders.  By
negotiating  exclusively  with  RUF  leaders,  arranging  for  the  creation  of  a  RUF  party  and
attempting to incorporate the RUF in a power-sharing agreement, previous peace agreements had
actually threatened to empower and legitimise those very individuals perpetuating the political
disengagement of combatants. In the end, effective military power was required to eliminate the
RUF’s spoiler leadership, allowing for a genuine attempt at  political reintegration and peace.
Third, the successful implementation of DDR hinged on the provision of a secure environment
once  negotiations  were  initiated.  In  Sierra  Leone's  case,  the  security  required  for  DDR was
heavily dependent on external actors, a factor that, as will become clear, has complicated the task
of political reintegration in the long term. 
The Failure of the RUF Party
In line with the experiences of other peace processes, it was perhaps inevitable that some attempt
would be made to transform the RUF into a viable political entity, as opposed to dismantling the
organisation entirely. This move was intended to aid political integration in a number of ways.
First,  it  would  act  as  a  visible  sign  of  political  acceptance  and  incorporation,  whereby
demobilising fighters were assured of their stake in a new and more inclusive political landscape.
Second,  it  could  help  to  incorporate  remnants  of  the  RUF  leadership,  which  might  prove
disruptive to continued efforts at reconciliation and reintegration if not brought into the political
fold. Third, and perhaps of greatest importance to long-term peace, the creation of a political
RUF party would provide ex-combatants with a conduit for political expression and an alternative
to violence as a means of realising personal, social and economic goals. The Lomé agreement
therefore  included  provisions  to  help  the  RUF  transform  into  a  political  party  which  were
implemented by the government in the run-up to the 2002 elections. In Freetown, Bo and Makeni,
offices were purchased to enable the official registration of the Revolutionary United Front Party
(RUFP),  with  Nigeria  contributing  equipment  and  training  to  RUFP representatives  in  party
management. 
Despite  successfully  fielding  203  parliamentary  candidates  for  the  2002  election,  the  RUFP
performed poorly, a consistent outcome throughout the party’s short existence. In 2002, it failed
to win a single seat, securing just 2.2% of the parliamentary vote and 1.7% for its presidential
candidate. In contrast, the ruling SLPP party of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah secured a landslide victory
with 69.9% of the vote. In July 2007, the RUFP as a political project came to an end when it
opted to merge with the APC, the very target of its original violent invasion. The failure of the
RUF to garner the votes of former combatants and to reinvent itself as a political party is key to
understanding more generally why previous attempts to politically integrate its leadership had
failed, directly reflecting the nature of the RUF as an organisation, the factors that had fuelled
conflict and the needs and priorities of its combatants.
On a purely practical  level  the RUF was not equipped to operate as a political  entity in  the
democratic  system.  Its  members,  whether  at  leadership  level  or  at  grass  roots,  had  little
knowledge of political campaigning or management, with experiences shaped instead by a decade
of  conflict  beyond the bounds of civil  society.  More than 30% of  combatants  lacked formal
education,  with  illiteracy  in  RUF  ranks  particularly  high  and  political  awareness  largely
determined by the commanders’ selective control of information.24 Indeed, the RUF was defined
as a movement by the political disengagement of its young membership. A 2003 survey found
that more than half of ex-RUF combatants held no political affiliation prior to the conflict and
continued to hold no affiliation post-conflict.25 With much of the RUF leadership under arrest, the
remnants  of  the  rebel  leadership  were  hardly  in  a  position  to  appeal  to  the  Sierra  Leonean
electorate or manage the party effectively.26 This problem was made clear in 2003 when five of
the RUF’s most senior leaders,  Foday Sankoh, Sam Bockarie, Issa Sesay,  Morris Kallon and
Augustine Gbao, were indicted by the Special  Court  on 17 counts of war  crimes and crimes
against  humanity.  It  quickly became clear that  the  RUF had neither  the  personnel  to  staff  a
competent  party  and  election  campaign,  nor  a  politically  sensitised  constituency  of  its  own
members from which to launch.  
The attempt to transform the RUF into a political party not only misunderstood the technical
capacity of the movement but, crucially, also its nature and the motives of its young membership.
Throughout the conflict,  RUF combatants  had primarily  been concerned with basic needs as
opposed to political ideology. According to the 2003 survey, RUF combatants remained focussed
upon  “access  to  security,  food,  and  education  –  and  not  on  the  political  agenda  of  the
movement”.27 Combatants’ reasons for participating in the conflict were predominantly related to
these priorities, with many fighters looking to gain personal security and economic advantage by
joining the rebel group, as opposed to looking to the RUF to pursue a set of political goals. In the
context of peace therefore, the RUF became redundant to many ex-combatants. Yet not only did
ex-combatants often lack political motive; many had originally exercised little choice in joining
the RUF. Eighty-seven percent of RUF respondents to the 2003 survey confirmed they had been
abducted into the faction, with only 9% stating that they joined in sympathy with the movement's
political  aims.28 With such a high rate of forced conscription, many ex-RUF combatants also
viewed themselves as victims of the conflict, and as such did not see the RUF as the natural
champion of their concerns in the post-conflict environment.29 
The  RUFP  was  also  unfeasible  due  to  the  immediate  post-conflict  attitude  of  demobilised
combatants. For many former RUF combatants, the end of the conflict marked a new start, with
their hopes for an improvement in living conditions strengthened by a significant international
presence and the extensive flow of aid. Looking to integrate into Sierra Leone's communities,
former RUF fighters had to navigate a delicate reconciliation process, living side-by-side with
victims of atrocities and within a population where the rebel group was deeply unpopular. In such
circumstances, there was an understandable inclination for ex-combatants to distance themselves
from the RUF, with some bypassing the official DDR process altogether so as to avoid the social
stigma of being labelled a former rebel.30 Ex-combatants wishing to play down their former RUF
credentials were particularly unlikely to support  the hard-line RUF leaders that were gaining
influence in the absence of Foday Sankoh, himself indicted for war crimes.31 These leaders were
not perceived by combatants as representative of their political concerns, but as corrupt, gaining
considerable economic benefits which contrasted starkly with the situation of the rank and file
and – particularly in the run-up to elections in 2002 – as obstructing the demobilisation and
reintegration programme.32 Internal leadership disputes and bitter  in-fighting further served to
undermine support, ensuring that ex-RUF fighters sought other avenues for political expression,
ultimately condemning the RUFP to electoral failure.
It is arguable that the creation of the RUFP was undertaken for political expediency in the full
knowledge that its prospects were severely limited.33 Some commentators have argued that in
contrast  to  UNAMSIL,  the  Government  of  Sierra  Leone  actively  sought  to  undermine  the
establishment  of  the  RUFP,  obstructing  the  process  in  favour  of  pursuing  a  total  military
eradication of the RUF.34 Nevertheless,  even if active governmental support  had been clearly
provided, the unsuitability of the RUF for political transformation remained a major obstacle to
its achievement. The damaging effect RUF leaders had upon the political integration of the rank
and file further showed that the dismantling of the group, rather than its political consolidation,
would be of greater benefit to the peacebuilding project. 
Political Reintegration: Beyond the RUF Party
The  RUF’s  inability  to  reinvent  itself  as  a  political  party  did  not  mean  that  the  political
reintegration of its combatants had failed – but rather the opposite.  In the immediate post-conflict
environment,  ex-combatants  found  that  they  were  able  to  pursue  their  concerns  through
established political  parties and the wider institutions of Sierra Leonean civil society without
recourse to their RUF identity. That the RUF failed to secure a single seat in the 2002 elections
was not only testament to the unsuitability of the RUF for political transformation but also a sign
that civil society had, to some extent, successfully undertaken the role of voicing and addressing
the  concerns  of  ex-combatants.  Nevertheless,  despite  this  apparent  progress,  ex-combatant's
interaction with civil society groups and political bodies has not been linked to an associated
investment of confidence in domestic institutions, but rather stems from a trust in the capacity of
outside actors. 
An  institution  which  played  a  key  role in  recognising  the  political,  social  and  economic
disengagement which had motivated many RUF combatants was the the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC).35  Crucially, its 2004 statement on the causes of the conflict acknowledged
the part  of previous administrations  in  rendering Sierra Leone vulnerable  to  conflict  through
political  abuses  and  mismanagement.36 This  recognition  in  itself  assisted  the  political
reintegration  of  the  RUF,  not  only  by  facilitating  reconciliation  and  understanding  between
victims and perpetrators,  but  also by signalling that  addressing RUF political grievances was
deemed integral to the formation of a more equitable Sierra Leonean political landscape. The
TRC's final statement was also highly significant for the political reintegration of the RUF in its
attempt to move beyond a simple recognition of these legitimate issues towards the formation of
government  policy designed to incorporate  them in the national  project  of peacebuilding.  Of
pressing concern to the TRC was tackling the “youth question”, which it viewed as central to the
disengagement  of  RUF combatants  and  as  representing  a  “national  emergency  that  demands
national mobilisation”.37 The TRC recognised the devastation caused during the conflict by the
“lethal cocktail of youth marginalisation and political manipulation”, and noted with alarm that
youth  continued  to  “languish  in  a  twilight  zone  of  unemployment  and  despair.”38 The
commission's  final  report  therefore  recommended  the  legal  incorporation  of  youth  in  party
political representation and the establishment of a National Youth Commission to “address the
youth question as a fundamental priority in post-war reconstruction”.39 In June 2003, the Sierra
Leonean Government  launched the National  Youth  Policy,  which promised to  provide  youth
“empowerment in a post-conflict  context” and affirmed a cross-governmental  commitment  to
“mainstreaming  youth  related  activities  in  the  overall  process  of  national  reconstruction”.40
Complemented by the establishment of the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Government of
Sierra Leone made every indication to young ex-combatants that, following demobilisation, they
would receive special  political  attention in  their  own right,  allowing them a stake in society
denied by pre-conflict administrations. However, tangible results of this commitment have been
somewhat limited.41 Neither the establishment of a National Youth Commission nor the party
political  reforms  recommended  by  the  TRC  have  been  implemented.  To  some  extent,  the
Ministry of Youth and Sports took on the role intended for the youth commission, yet it was
precisely because the TRC concluded that “the Ministry of Youth does not have the means to
address the youth question” that it had advocated the creation of the commission.42 Following its
success in the 2007 elections, the APC government chose to merge the Ministry of Youth and
Sports with the Ministry of Education, seemingly further reducing the capacity of a ministry
already underfunded and acutely lacking in political impetus. Whilst there was some expediency
in merging ministries that clearly overlap in their relevance to youth, the APC move was perhaps
more reflective of a financial logic, which strikes at the heart of the weakness of government-
sponsored  political  integration  efforts;  namely  a  scarcity  of  budgetary resources  and  a  weak
political infrastructure. 
Aside  from  economic  limitations,  the  government's  failure  to  implement  the  TRC's
recommendations  on  youth-policy related  also  to the  dominance  of  NGOs  and  civil  society
groups in the political sensitisation and empowerment of ex-combatants. The state had effectively
outsourced this crucial area of development to NGOs, donors and UN bodies who have funded
and  managed  a  vast  number  of  projects  aimed  at  facilitating  dialogue  between  young  ex-
combatants and Sierra Leonean communities,  providing public platforms for consultation and
discussion over  key issues.  Through workshops and surveys,  organisations  such as  the  Post-
conflict  Reintegration  Initiative  for  Development  and  Empowerment  (PRIDE)  have  played  a
crucial role in both relaying former RUF fighters’ concerns and in informing them of the details
of policy and related institutions. In the run-up to elections, such NGOs and donor-funded bodies
were instrumental in sensitising ex-combatants to the electoral process, encouraging high voter
registration and active participation in the political system. Sierra Leonean-led groups such as
PRIDE, which maintain a special focus on the reintegration of former combatants, have further
aided political incorporation not only through their work but through their direct employment of
ex-RUF fighters.  These initiatives  have assisted the political  reintegration project by offering
former combatants a voice in the environs of peace that they were unable to locate in conflict,
providing a real incentive to eschew the way of the gun for peaceful political interaction. The
interaction of non-governmental groups with large numbers of young ex-RUF combatants has
consequently helped consolidate the official national policy of bringing youth issues to the centre
of government.
However, the NGO-led initiatives also constitute a double-edged sword. First, it is questionable
whether NGOs and civil society groups, formed around immediate conflict-related issues, can
provide  a  long-term  forum  for  political  involvement  and,  indeed,  the  employment  of  ex-
combatants. As the international presence in Sierra Leone scales down, the capacity of the state,
in  particular  of  government  bodies  such as  the  Ministry of  Youth,  Sports  and Education,  to
assume this responsibilty and continue this level of political engagement with ex-combatants at a
local  level  will be severely tested. Second, and more ominously,  the involvement  of ex-RUF
fighters  in  NGO  projects  and  civil-society  groups  may  not  translate  into  genuine  political
integration on a national level, particularly as these projects rely so heavily on external actors and
donor funds. The 2003 survey of ex-combatants points towards the high price paid for NGO and
UN involvement:
Ex-combatants  have  faith  more  in  outsiders  than  in  their  own  government.  The
experience with UNAMSIL has been a positive one, but ex-combatants see appeals to the
international  community  and  to  NGOs  as  the  best  ways  to  hold  their  government
accountable and to achieve positive results.43
If former fighters of the RUF are relying on the presence and work of international organisations
to guarantee their political stake in society, the political activity of many ex-combatants may not
have truly assisted their integration into Sierra Leone’s political system, but rather the opposite.
This problem is exacerbated by continued widespread cynicism of ex-combatants towards home-
grown  politicians  and  institutions,  which  has  strengthened  the  prevailing  belief  that  Sierra
Leone’s  future  depends  entirely  on  international  intervention  and  regulation.44 In  a  country
severely lacking state capacity even prior to the conflict, the strong presence and footprint of
NGOs and international organisations is perhaps to be expected, but nevertheless, the long-term
reintegration of former RUF fighters requires that they invest trust in the inherent capacity of
Sierra Leone's own political institutions to meet and manage their expectations. The high turn-out
of former RUF fighters in the 2002 and 2007 elections would seem to indicate some success in
this respect. However, the 2003 survey of ex-combatants paints a gloomier picture:
Ex-combatants believe quite seriously that the most effective means of changing
government  policy  is  through  pressure  from  the  outside.  Internal  accountability  
mechanisms are not seen as credible, when compared to the potential influence of NGOs 
and the international community more broadly.45 
Although ex-combatants may have voted in 2002 in order to bring about change and register their
commitment to peace, much of their confidence in the ballot was firmly rooted in faith in external
actors to act as guarantor. Progress in building confidence in domestic institutions since the 2002
elections  has  been limited.  A 2007 survey by the  BBC World Service Trust  and Search for
Common Ground, taken in the run-up to the elections, found that most respondents maintained
little or no trust in national  politicians and felt that political protest against unjust legislation
would do little to  change  government  policy.46 This failure  to  establish  trust  among ex-RUF
combatants in Sierra Leone's own political institutions is linked to insufficient progress on two
key fronts; the fight against corruption, and tackling Sierra Leone's economic underdevelopment. 
Building Confidence: Corruption
Despite voting in large numbers in successive national elections, ex-combatants still  feel that
corruption and patrimonial politics continue largely unabated.47 This perception can be traced to
post-conflict instances of corruption and abuse in public political institutions. In the run-up to the
2002 elections, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) was dogged by a scandal in which
three of its five commissioners were indicted by the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), the
body established to instil faith in public institutions by rooting out such malpractice.48 In 2004,
the NEC Chairman resigned from office,  claiming  that  the  ruling SLPP party had  sought  to
tamper  with  the  results  of  local  elections  (the  NEC  also  expressed  concern  over  voting
irregularities the following year).  In  2004, the ICG lamented the lack of commitment by the
government  in  countering  corruption,  citing the case  of  Momoh  Pujeh,  a  former  Minster  of
Transport  whose conviction for unlawful  possession of precious materials was overturned on
particularly tenuous grounds.49 Indeed, in some respects,  the government appeared to actively
hinder  the  work  of  the  ACC;  delays  in  processing  cases  by  the  Attorney-General's  Office
consistently  slowed  prosecutions,  and  President  Kabbah  openly  condemned  the  ACC  for
focussing on the prosecution of government ministers. In 2007, the ICG described the ACC as
“virtually moribund”, accusing it of “sending the wrong message about endemic corruption”.50
Alongside these political abuses, ex-combatants were also dismayed by the reappearance, post-
conflict, of local and national elites that had dominated Sierra Leone prior to the outbreak of
hostilities and represented the inequitable pre-conflict system of patrimony.51 A pertinent example
was the restoration of traditional Paramount Chiefs to positions of authority in the local system of
government. Enacted immediately after the war and heavily funded by the UK's Department for
International Development (DFID), the move was regarded as an effective means to secure the
regional control and stability necessary for post-conflict reconstruction. This “attempt to restore
the past”, as President Kabbah described it, was severely criticised for reinforcing the notion of
“same car, different driver”.52 In a subsequent DfID-sponsored evaluation, it became clear that
rural  youths  in  particular  resented  the  restoration  of  Paramount  Chiefs,  whom they  deemed
responsible for imposing unfair and exclusionary private jurisprudence, precisely the grievance
that had prompted so many youths to join the RUF.53 Consequently, although the move initially
appeared to hold value for political integration by establishing local political authority, it actually
risked undermining this very same objective by restoring socio-political divisions. 
Notwithstanding the criticisms aimed at government institutions and public bodies, it is arguable
that  progress has undeniably been made, particularly given the challenges faced and the long
history of endemic corruption in Sierra Leone. An example is the NEC, which in spite of many
obstacles has been relatively successful in battling electoral fraud, particularly in its handling of
the 2007 elections – for which it took sole responsibility. Nevertheless, such progress may be
insufficient to restore ex-combatants’ faith in Sierra Leone's political system. In a 2005 report on
the battle against corruption, the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) concluded that “most
Sierra  Leoneans  are  convinced  that  corruption  is  on  the  increase”,  confirming  that  many
remained “pessimistic about the Commission’s mission to eradicate corruption in the country”.54
Following the 2007 elections, an internal  government  investigation found that  corruption had
indeed been rife under the previous regime of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Such corruption, both in its
day-to-day  effect  on  Sierra  Leoneans  and  in  its  impact  on  perceptions,  has  deepened  ex-
combatants’  cynicism  towards  the  political  establishment,  entrenching  their  political
disengagement  
Building Confidence: the Economy 
Sierra  Leone's  long-term  ability  to  incorporate  ex-combatants  politically  remains  intimately
linked to its ability to incorporate them economically, a factor that has proven far more critical to
an ex-RUF fighter’s renunciation of violence than any political incentive. Failure in this area has
led  to  a  failure  in  tackling  corruption  and  meeting  the  expectations  of  demobilised  RUF
combatants.55 In terms of the number of combatants processed and the apparent consolidation of
peace following its eventual completion, the DDR programme is widely regarded as a success.56
Nevertheless, the reintegration project in Sierra Leone has encountered severe difficulties, not
only  in  securing  funding  and  long-term  commitments,  but  also  with  the  overall  desperate
condition of Sierra Leone's economy into which demobilised combatants are expected to return.
In 2006, the UN estimated that 70% of Sierra Leone's population continued to live below the
poverty line, with the concentration of poverty the highest in rural areas away from Freetown, the
very areas in which the RUF had previously prospered from economic and political discontent.57
In 2007, the UN warned of Sierra Leone's “severe financial crisis”, with the ICG also noting that
youth unemployment had reached an all time high of 80%.58  Significantly, according to a report
of the Peace Building Commission, the effects of poverty have been felt most acutely by Sierra
Leone's youth, a demographic that includes many former RUF combatants:
Two thirds of the youth population is unemployed and largely marginalized from the
political system, and lacks adequate education and training. Significantly, many of the
dire conditions that gave rise to the conflict in 1991 remain in 2006, with many youths
unemployed, marginalized and lacking hope for the future.59
This bleak assessment echoes that of the TRC in its 2004 final report, where it found that ex-
combatant's  political  integration was being undermined by the continued desperation of their
social and economic destitution, stating: “many ex-combatants testified that the conditions that
caused them to join the conflict persist in the country, and if given the opportunity, they would
fight again”.60 Accordingly, following DDR, many former RUF combatants have returned to the
fringes of Sierra Leone, both geographically and socio-politically, rejoining the growing number
of youths seeking profit from alluvial diamond mining in the border regions or taking their place
among the swollen ranks of the towns’ unemployed.61 This represents a worrying echo of the pre-
war situation, where large groups of unemployed youth and diamond miners were alienated from
the Freetown political machinery and came to view conflict as a means of empowerment. Once
again, economic conditions are causing the political marginalisation of former RUF fighters. 
Sierra  Leone's  economic  situation  also  risks  engendering a  potentially  destabilising  sense  of
disillusionment  and  frustration.  Clearly,  incentives  to  eschew violence  for  peaceful  political
discourse are quickly diminishing for those former combatants who have failed to realise the
economic  and  social  advancement  expected  from  DDR.  The  majority  of  demobilised  RUF
combatants  who  have  remained  in  Sierra  Leone  had  expectations  of  extensive  economic
development, which may very well outstretch the realistic capacity of the country, at least in the
short term. In a 2001 report entitled “Managing Uncertainty”, the ICG warned that failure of the
DDR programme and internationally sponsored reintegration schemes to meet the high hopes of
former combatants would almost certainly result in their return to violence as a means to securing
basic welfare security.62 In some instances, ex-RUF combatants have indeed returned to conflict
rather than seek to navigate the complex psychological and economic difficulties encountered in
peacetime. For many whose driving motivation has been to seek economic security, integration
into regional conflicts such as that in neighbouring Liberia has made far more sense than seeking
political reintegration into an impoverished Sierra Leone.63 The apparently profitable involvement
of  ex-combatants  in  regional  conflicts  –  or  at  least  reports  suggesting  such  activity  –  risks
encouraging former RUF fighters still in Sierra Leone to revaluate the benefits of peace. 
The 2007 Elections 
The 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections, widely seen as a crucial test of Sierra Leone's
capacity to manage political and security matters independently from external actors, served as a
marker-point for the progress of political reintegration and confidence-building efforts. In  the
absence  of  a  large  UN  peacekeeping  force  or  international  military  presence,  the  task  of
maintaining a stable security environment for free and fair elections was undertaken by the Sierra
Leonean police.  Voting arrangements,  including the sensitisation of the electorate,  monitoring
and counting the ballot, fell under the sole responsibility of the NEC. In further contrast to the
2002 election, the incumbent president, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, was constitutionally required to
step down and give way to a newly elected president. In this respect, whatever the result, the
conclusion of the election would involve a peaceful relinquishing of power by one leader and
regime to another, a major test for any society recently emerging from civil conflict. 
The 2007 election saw high voter registration and a subsequent turnout representing 75.8% of
Sierra  Leone's  total  population.  The  largely  successful  political  mobilisation  of  former  RUF
fighters reflected in part  an appreciation by the NEC and civil-society groups of the specific
circumstances affecting youth and ex-combatants. Along with workshops and surveys of ex-RUF
members,  regular  radio  broadcasts  proved  particularly  effective  in  mobilising  many  whose
illiteracy and educational background rendered election literature or complex political discourse
unsuitable. For those who had often suffered isolation from the electoral process through their
rural location and distance from the hub of Freetown, the use of radio broadcasts was a crucial
development.64 The promotion of youth issues to the heart of political campaigning may also have
played  a  part  in  the  high  turn-out,  with  the  major  parties  presenting  themselves  as  actively
seeking  to  resolve  the  problems  causing  discontent  among  Sierra  Leone's  youth  and  ex-
combatants.  Presidential  candidates  focused  heavily  on  youth  employment,  the  provision  of
education and the eradication of corruption, promising at youth rallies that such issues would be
the  central  preoccupation  of  their  presidency.65 The  increasingly  youth-centred  focus  of  the
parties owed much to the fact that of the 2.6 million Sierra Leoneans registered to vote, almost
40% were under the age of 27.66 
Despite the political rhetoric aimed at capturing the youth vote, a 2007 survey conducted prior to
the polls found that many Sierra Leoneans, particularly the youth, saw the political parties as
unrepresentative and as offering little real policy choice.67 In this sense, the votes of former RUF
fighters related more to a desire for change than an investment in one particular party or political
strategy  deemed  to  correspond  to  their  interests.68 Nevertheless,  in  a  country  where  such
dissatisfaction  had  previously  been  expressed  through  violence  and  a  rejection  of  political
authority, the use of the vote by ex-combatants in this manner was deemed a positive sign for the
political  reintegration project.  Optimism also stemmed from the country's  ability to survive a
number of potentially destabilising factors in the run-up to and during the elections, such as the
delay of voting by two weeks, the close nature of the contest and, crucially, spates of violence in
the  lead-up  to  the  second  round  of  voting,  which  at  one  point  threatened  to  derail  voting
altogether. 
Yet while encouraging in many respects, the high voter turn-out and completion of the elections
were  not  tantamount  to  successful  political  reintegration.  In  actual  fact,  the  2007  elections
highlighted the growth of a number of developments which served to undermine the political
reintegration of former RUF combatants. Perhaps most critically, they showed that even where
ex-combatants had been politically incorporated, some  forms of political participation actually
proved divisive or detrimental to their long-term political reintegration.  
The violence in the second round of voting provides a potent illustration of this point and of the
need  to  examine  the  specific  form  of  political  participation  achieved  among  former  rebels.
Following the failure of any candidate to secure the required 55% of the vote, tensions between
supporters of all sides greatly intensified and street rallies turned violent. Police were forced to
use tear gas to disperse battling APC and SLPP supporters across the country, moving President
Kabbah to threaten to impose a state of emergency to curb what he described as “the current state
of intimidation, molestation and violent acts”.69  Tensions on the streets were matched by tensions
between the contending candidates, and amid increasing claims and counter-claims of political
intimidation, President Kabbah was unable to gain the attendance of both the SLPP's Solomon
Berewa and the APC's Ernest Koroma at a public rally to denounce the civil unrest.70 Despite this
setback, the second round of voting was successfully completed and the APC emerged victorious.
Having failed to win a  court  injunction barring the NEC from announcing the results  on 17
September, the defeated SLPP duly conducted a peaceful transition of power. However, looters
subsequently ransacked the headquarters of the SLPP and in Mile 91, a base for a large number of
ex-RUF  combatants,  many  violent  attacks  against  journalists  and  SLPP  supporters  were
reported.71
Some observers interpreted the tensions of the second round of voting as a positive sign for the
health of democratic development in Sierra Leone.72 It is certainly clear that the closeness of the
vote forced the major parties to court the electorate, increasing the likelihood that policies would
incorporate ex-combatants’ concerns and that ex-combatants would themselves see their votes as
having a direct effect on the political landscape. The split of Charles Margai from the SLPP to
form the People's  Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC), which arguably cost  Solomon
Berewa the election, was widely deemed a positive development for democracy in Sierra Leone
in  that  it  limited  the  chances  of  a  landslide  victory  for  the  incumbent  regime,  consequently
increasing accountability and reliance on public support by the new government.73 Nevertheless,
if the aim of politically integrating former RUF combatants was to consolidate their move away
from violence towards peaceful political intercourse as a means to bring change, the violence was
far from positive. An immediate concern was the direct involvement of ex-RUF combatants, with
all sides accused of using former rebel and CDF soldiers to intimidate opposition supporters and
candidates. In an interview with IRIN, the director of PRIDE, Ibrahim Bangura, confirmed the
recruitment of ex-RUF combatants by political parties as bodyguards and security, noting that the
head  of  the  APC's  security  operations  was  ex-RUF  fighter  Idrissa  Kamara.74 The  cynical
employment of former rebel combatants in acts of political intimidation and crime in 2007 was a
worrying mirror of the abusive practices that had characterised the one-party regime of Siaka
Stevens in the 1970s and 1980s. Through their desperate economic situation and experiences of
violence, ex-combatants remain particularly vulnerable to such recruitment, a fact underlined by
their involvement in regional conflicts. By incorporating former RUF fighters in acts of political
intimidation,  leaders  and  political  parties  in  Sierra  Leone  actually  served  to  reconnect  ex-
combatants  with  violence  as  opposed  to  consolidating  their  rejection  of  it.  Rather  than
demonstrating politics as an effective substitute for violence, violence was treated as an effective
means to influence politics.
The election violence also reflected the wider development of a negative political culture that did
little to build confidence in the capacity of post-conflict Sierra Leone to transcend the abuses that
had originally fostered conflict. In the run-up to elections, the UN Peacebuilding Commission
observed that “the discourse from political parties is showing signs of growing intolerance and
parties are still striving to become credible vehicles for political expression.”75 The dangerous
promotion of violence as a political method went hand in hand with party politics adopting a
more confrontational tone, culminating in President Kabbah’s injunction that contending parties
“desist  from making provocative and inflammatory statements against  each other” during the
election.76 The system into which the RUF was being incorporated was increasingly based on
zero-sum political competition, with the danger that ex-combatants invested in particular parties
over and above the system as a whole.77 In the long-term, the development of such a political
atmosphere risks seeing ex-combatants reject the authority of those leaders or parties for whom
they did not vote and encourage them to view any political failure of their party or leader as a
defeat of their own aspirations and political stake.78
The  resurrection  of  bitter  political  rivalries risked  aligning  ex-combatants  along  ethnic  and
regional  divisions,  which  have  in  the  past  informed  political  allegiances.  The  PMDC's
introduction to the political scene was a potentially positive development in this respect, serving
to break regional voting patterns by leading southern Mende voters to back the APC, traditionally
reliant on Temne support in the north.  However,  such divisions were still  deemed a pressing
concern by the UN Secretary-General in his December 2007 report to the Security Council, in
which he spoke of the “increasing dominance of ethnicity and regionalism in the politics of Sierra
Leone”, which, he added “could have a negative impact on peace-consolidation efforts in the
country”.79 The most obvious negative impact on peace-consolidation was precisely the risk that
ex-RUF combatants and former CDF fighters become embroiled in such rivalries, undermining
their  political  reintegration  and  fostering  political  grievances.80 The  underlying  lesson  for
integration  efforts  was  that  not  only  is  the  form  of  political  participation  achieved  by  ex-
combatants  an  important  consideration,  but  also  by  extension,  the  nature  of  the  political
environment  into  which  they  are  being  integrated.  The  increase  in  party  rivalries  and  local
divisions, leading to violence, illustrated that the environment into which the RUF was being
integrated was not conducive to peace or to a view of political discourse as inherently superior to
violence as a means of achieving change. 
The violence and mutual distrust between parties in the 2007 election further undermined the
political  reintegration of ex-RUF combatants by failing to build confidence in Sierra Leone's
internal political integrity. The 2002 elections had witnessed similarly violent clashes between
the short-lived RUFP and SLPP supporters in Freetown, which were eventually quashed by the
intervention  of  international  peacekeepers.81 This  did  little  to  reverse  perceptions  that  Sierra
Leone was reliant for its security and political stability on external actors. Similarly, despite the
ability  of  the  Sierra  Leonean  police  to  handle  the  more  widespread  outbreaks  in  2007,  the
confrontational and internecine behaviour of the parties risked reinforced the notion that, left to
its own devices, Sierra Leone's political system would inevitably default to its previous abusive
configuration.82 Although the NEC performed with relative transparency and competence in 2007,
this notion of 'politics as usual', or 'same car, different driver' was not unjustified, with allegations
of wider political malpractice well founded.83 In following the elections Mats Utas observed the
continuing play of patron-client politics in Sierra Leone: 
Hordes of people line up outside the SLPP party leader’s mansion in order to receive  
their mandatory money in exchange for promising their votes[...] Although most visible 
at the SLPP party leader’s mansion (simply because most money has been given away 
here) it is clear that all political parties and party functionaries on all levels have handed 
out money in exchange for support.84
The practice of  'votes  for  sale'  –  and its  very  visibility  –  represented a  further  threat  to  the
building of  faith among former  RUF fighters  in the  integrity  of  the  post-conflict  democratic
system and  its  capacity  to  transcend  the  exclusionary  politics  which  fostered  conflict.85 The
persistence  of  patrimonial  politics  accompanied  evidence  of  a  failure  to  root  out  endemic
corruption  in  Sierra  Leone's  political  institutions.  Following  his  inauguration  in  November,
President Koroma commissioned an audit of government ministries,  uncovering the continued
and  relatively  unchecked  proliferation  of  corruption  and  mismanagement  under  the  SLPP
regime.86  
The  2007  elections  have  been  viewed  by  many  as  a  positive  development  for  the  political
reintegration of the RUF through their demonstration of ex-combatant's willingness to channel
dissatisfaction politically, through the vote. However, this is to miss that such a commitment was
made in the short-term, and that continued persistence of such dissatisfaction posed a threat to the
longer-term commitment of former RUF fighters. This long-term political reintegration, and the
ability  of  Koroma's  government  to  build  confidence in  Sierra  Leone's  political  institutions,
remained dependent upon Sierra Leone's economic development. The BBC's correspondent in
Freetown,  Mark  Doyle,  pointedly  observed  that  for  the  presidential  inauguration  ceremony,
boycotted by the SLPP executive, the government was forced to rely on borrowed limousines and
UN helicopters to transport its dignitaries.87 At the focal point  of one of Sierra Leone's  most
encouraging  signs  for  the  consolidation  of  peace,  the  economic  strictures  which  threaten  to
undermine it were as apparent as ever.
Conclusion
The case of Sierra Leone demonstrates that the nature of a non-state armed group and the identity
and  motivations  of  its  members  directly  affect  the  form  and  relative  ease  of  its  political
reintegration. In the case of the RUF, the overall absence of a coherent political project, a limited
technical political capacity and the movement's  deep unpopularity with the civilian population
rendered it wholly unsuited for transformation into a political party. The importance of economic
drivers  for  conflict  and  the  large-scale  perpetration  of  atrocities  also  undermined  political
incentives for peace, particularly when compared to appeals based on the provision of amnesty,
basic welfare and security. In this respect, the political integration project in Sierra Leone also
shows  that  offers  of  political  power  to  a  non-state  armed  actor  must  be  informed  by  an
understanding of the motivations of both its leadership and rank-and-file combatants, which are
likely to differ widely. In Sierra Leone, the relationship of RUF leaders to their combatants was
such that it served to undermine rather than facilitate their political reintegration. Hence another
implication for political integration projects, which may run counter to conventional approaches,
is that the dismantling rather than the political formalisation of a non-state armed actor may in
fact best serve its political integration. Finally, the Sierra Leone experience shows that decisive
military force applied against spoiler elements in a leadership can serve to facilitate combatants’
involvement in DDR and wider political re-engagement. 
The RUF's unsuitability for conventional political incorporation demonstrated that the success of
political integration cannot be judged solely by a group's ability to form a party or share power.
Instead, a more holistic account is necessary to appreciate the extent  to which ex-combatants
locate opportunities for expression and resolution of political concerns through a wide variety of
formal and informal means, be it through participation in civil society groups, public discussion
or interaction with established political institutions. Likewise, the Sierra Leone case shows that
the success of this wider process cannot be judged by the narrow terms of electoral participation
or the absence of renewed conflict, but must include less tangible indicators such as the extent to
which ex-combatants hold faith in political  interaction to deliver results,  and the foundations
upon which such confidence is based. Directly related to this approach, the experience of the
RUF demonstrates that not only does the nature and identity of non-state armed actors impact on
the  form  and  potential  success  of  political  reintegration,  but  so  too  does  the  nature  and
configuration of the political system into which they are being incorporated. In the case of Sierra
Leone, the involvement  of international  actors in politically incorporating ex-combatants was
often positive and needed, but did it result in the RUF investing in external actors and assistance
as opposed to Sierra Leone's own institutions? Similarly, the nature of Sierra Leone's political
system, as highlighted by the 2007 elections, in many instances served to erode ex-combatants’
confidence in political intercourse, or to reinforce violence as an acceptable method to achieve
change.  Finally,  underpinning  all  of  these  factors,  Sierra  Leone's  continuing  experience
demonstrates that for a group such as the RUF, political and economic reintegration are two sides
of  the  same  coin.88 For  combatants  whose  primary  agenda  in  conflict  was  to  secure  basic
economic and welfare security, their long-term commitment to peaceful political interaction over
and above violence is predicated upon successful economic incorporation. Given Sierra Leone's
severe underdevelopment, and that of many societies emerging from violent conflict, progress in
this respect represents one of the greatest challenges for the political reintegration of non-state
armed groups. 
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